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Nurture and Natural Law
David F. Forte*
PROLOGUE
When I was six or seven, growing up in Somerville, Massachu-
setts, my father took me on the bus and the MTA into Boston to
walk the Freedom Trail. It was his practice to try to do something
alone with each of his three sons on succeeding Saturdays. As we
progressed along the Trail, smelling the dust and exhaust fumes
of old Boston, my father walked me back into the eighteenth cen-
tury. We strolled over the Common, and looked into Old South
Church (the Boston Tea Party started here, he pointed out), down
to the Old State House (the Massacre happened in front of it),
Fanueil Hall (stopping for lunch nearby at Durgin Park), and up
to North Church (the lanterns signalling Paul Revere looked out
to Back Bay, which was water then, he explained). At each stop,
he would have me picture the people, the conflicts, the emotions
that accompanied the Revolution. It was a time of wonder for me.
The names of Otis, Hancock, Revere, the Adams cousins, and
even Crispus Attucks were impressed into my mind. This, you
should know, was shortly before the Southeast Expressway had
cut through Haymarket Square, destroying parts of the Italian
and Chinese neighborhoods of Boston, and long before the gen-
trification of Quincy Market. To find the eighteenth century, my
father and I had to wend through the vegetable carts and butch-
ers' stalls, avoiding the roaring delivery trucks which appeared in
far greater profusion than what can be seen there today. History
then had to be found and imagined. It had yet to be cleaned up
and placed beside the boutique and atrium restaurant.
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law; J.D.,
Columbia University; Ph.D., University of Toronto; M.A., Manchester
University; A.B., Harvard College. My colleagues Professors Joel Finer,
Peter Garlock, Richard Rakos, Dena Davis, James Wilson, and Linda
Ammons of Cleveland State University, as well as, Professor Paul Lauritzen
of John Carroll University, and my friend Dr. Joel Levin, gave valuable
advice to me on this Essay, and Michael Fanning, student at Cleveland State
University College of Law, provided crucial assistance.
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Since that time, history has always been an exercise in imagina-
tion to me, as I attempt to transfer myself into the person and
time I am reading about. Today, my father (now eighty-five) and
I exchange history books and articles. When he visits Ohio, we
take automobile treks to find the Old Northwest Territory, Con-
necticut's Western Reserve, and the industrial revolution. We are
the best of friends in our shared quest to know, and we enjoy each
other's company immensely.
Now I suggest that if you who read this had a reasonably happy
childhood, there was some moment (or moments) of similar
awakening for you. As it was for me, I should think that event
would be but one small instant in a rich texture of experiences,
events, and discoveries that you, your parents, your siblings and
relatives, and your childhood friends created and shared. In that
texture, I, like you, found and pursued my particular identity,
which was exactly what my parents hoped would happen. Since
that time, neither I, nor you, have stopped in formation of our
selves. And I, like you, continue to seek to make that self "bet-
ter": in the skills of our respective crafts, in our physical well-
being-and perhaps most importantly-in our moral actions. If
we don't, we know that we ought to (I really must begin exercis-
ing soon). We have setbacks, but the quest continues. We all, I
suggest, spend our lives constantly seeking to become better
persons.
Now, if that last sentence strikes you as reasonable, then I wel-
come you to the world of natural law. For what we have jointly
found reasonable in that sentence is the following: (1) That we
are "beings," existing over time and in place; (2) that we are
aware of our "beingness," that is to say, we are each a "self"; (3)
that at the root of our being is an individual personality that is
unique and can never be replicated; (4) that we all strive to make
our selves better, physically, materially, intellectually, and mor-
ally; (5) that succeeding in making ourselves better is an exercise
in judgment, based on our capacities and on the manner in which
we interrelate with our environment and other persons; (6) that
we could not have formed our personalities as we have without
some vital, caring assistance of other persons; and (7) that we
know all this by reflecting upon our (and others') lives, that is to
say, upon our shared human experience.' Each of those proposi-
I In this, I, of course, differ toto caelo from the deconstructionists and
other antinomians who hold that realty is unknowable or that, at best, it is
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tions is a staple of a natural law philosophy, and each comes from
a manner of reasoning that is more reflective than analytical
though no less logical.
I. NURTURE
What my father did for me that Saturday, and what my parents
and other relatives did for me every day of my childhood, was to
nurture me. They gave me direction, encouragement, example,
and material sustenance so that I could "do all that I was capable
of doing," as the stock phrase goes. Whatever potentiality for
excellence they divined in me they sought to nurture, that is, they
sought to provide me with the basis for my own individual
achievement.
It was not mere altruism that my parents gave to me, but the
broader virtue of nurture. Altruism, defined as giving to another
without thought of gain for oneself,2 is a drier concept than nur-
ture. I can conceive of altruism at arm's length, a distant form of
assistance-modem welfare structures, for example.' Nurture
requires a complex and subtle relationship, and, usually, some
degree of intimacy. Nor is it ordinary friendship. If it is friend-
ship, it is at least a special form of friendship. Aristotle described
friendship as seeking the good of the other,4 but the kind of good
that nurture seeks is the self-realization of the other. Nurture,
therefore, requires more than kindness and certainly more than
constructed through our own will-directed rationality. Instead, I adhere to
the realist tradition in philosophy and begin without justification or any felt
need for justification on the ground that human co-rationality and
intersubjectivity give us access to reality, permit us to understand reality as
it is and as it is experienced by humans, and to make arguments and reach
conclusions about reality that we can convince one another of. In other
words, the philosophers of the natural law tradition approach philosophy
the way any ordinary person approaches life: it's there, and despite its
difficulties, it can be understood.
2 See generally C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARDS A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER (1991) (analyzing social and psychological
bases of altruistic behavior); 1 ERVIN STAUB, PosrTvE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND
MORALITY: SOCIAL AND PERSONAL INFLUENCES (1978) (examining types of
influences that cause people to behave positively towards others).
3 MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 167-99
(1992) (describing history of welfare programs in United States).
4 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS,
Book IX ch. 4, 293 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1980) [hereafter ARISTOTLE,
ETHICS].
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pity. It depends upon empathy, but is a special form of action
taken at the moral behest of empathy.5
True, like altruism, nurture seeks to benefit another, and like
friendship, it seeks the good of the other. The good it seeks,
however, is an excellence of accomplishment in any of the arts of
life, whether knowledge, productivity, aesthetics, or moral acuity.
The goal of self-realization is in that excellence of accomplish-
ment, itself an ongoing process that never ends.6 Nurture looks
to the particular endowments of the individual and seeks to pro-
vide the basis for that individual's instantiation of her own iden-
tity. It fosters growth, "perfects, advances, furthers" the good
that is in the other person, to "unfold more completely" one's
latent capacities. 7 It respects the individuality of the other per-
son. Think, for example, of how parents enjoy describing the
unique personalities of each of their children.'
Nurture is not, however, doting kindness. It does not serve
another's wants or desires, but rather it looks to another's needs.9
By "needs," I mean that ensemble of requirements-material,
emotional, and moral-that supports a particular individual's
achievement of any range of life's goods.' ° Nurture can, there-
fore, include a real component of discipline, for ultimately, it is
the habit of self-discipline that permits us to accomplish anything
5 See C. Daniel Batson, How Social an Animal? The Human Capacity for
Caring, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Mar. 1990, at 330, 339-40 (exploring whether
empathetic desire to help others arises from egoism or altruism).
6 JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGI-rrs 96 (1980).
7 SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 82
(1989).
8 Nor can we say that nurture is only an instinctive response of the human
animal to preserve his gene pool for future reproductive success. The wide
practice of abortion (and indeed of contraception) militate against nurture
being merely an instinctive response to increase the chances of survival.
Rather, nurture has to be a moral command, bred of our sense of our
human selves and identities. And like all moral commands, nurture may be
well or ill practiced.
9 To the question of whether something is good because one desires it,
or he desires it because it is good, Aristotle decided upon the latter, but his
notion of desire in this case was the organism's seeking to have its natural
good actualized, rather than in having its range of pleasures increased.
HENRY B. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? 101 (1985).
10 Needs, in this sense, are objective. They are "goods" in need of
satisfaction. To take a personal predilection, a person may want potato
chips, but need broccoli. Or, a person may want to watch MTV, but need to
study her math.
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of personal note. Put another way, nurture assists another person
in her particular participation in and among life's objective
goods. ' I
Under the theory of natural law there are certain values that are
objectively good for the human person: life, knowledge, virtue,
craft, aesthetics, community, and so on. (There is some variation
in the litany, depending upon the theorist.) Nonetheless, the
manner of accomplishing or participating in these goods is fully
individual. Further, since the manner of participation is a matter
of personal judgment, it is also a matter of personal responsibil-
ity. One can know how well one is doing in the effort for a greater
involvement in the goods of life, that is to say, one can know (if
one reflects on it) whether one is indeed becoming a better per-
son. Accordingly, one could also fairly judge whether another
person was "wasting his talents," or, "becoming a credit to
himself."
Parents tend to blame themselves for the moral and material
failings of their children. Indeed, nurture, like all moral actions,
needs judgment, craft, and practical reasonableness to be success-
ful. It requires enormous subtlety, a sense of timing and propor-
tion, and a notion of how to measure success in increments. A
nurturing parent is daily called upon not only to perceive and
exploit opportunities for the child, but to control and mitigate
any damage that can occur from all sides, even from the parent's
own missteps. All of us can recall attempts at nurture that have
failed because of our lack of knowledge, or from poor execution.
Nonetheless, nurture, strictly speaking, cannot be said to have
failed simply because the recipient turned out to be a ne'er-do-
well. That nurture is directed to the self-realization of the other
person means that the other person has a responsibility for his
relative range of successes and failures. In nurture, one gives for
the good of the other. If the other fails to "make good" on the
gift (absent a misfortune or harm not of one's making), it is that
person's failure, not the parent's.
Nurture, like many other forms of assistance to others, depends
upon empathy, a concept noted by moral philosophers such as
Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, and Adam Smith.' 2
But it is more than just associating one's self with another's par-
'I FINNIs, supra note 6, at 64, 84, 96, 100, 104.
12 See BATSON, supra note 2, at 17-32 (summarizing various philosophical
views on egoism and altruism).
1993] 695
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ticular needs (e.g., "If I were hungry and on the street, I would
want a hot meal."). Rather, nurture's empathy is one that not just
identifies with the other, but respects the other's particularity. It
sees the other as a self like my self, unique and having its own
special gifts. Thus, although I have little talent in graphic arts, if I
see my four year old son delighting for hours in drawing and
molding, I shall seek an opportunity for that talent to develop
according to its own potentialities.
Finally, the giving of nurture, though directed at the individual
good of the other, is necessary for the moral self-realization of the
giver himself. It is an act of moral excellence that requires empa-
thy, judgment, restraint, and respect for the other person. As we
would have been hampered in developing each of our respective
identities had we not received nurture from someone else, so too,
without opportunities to dispense nurture, we would be unable to
achieve our own moral individuality. Thus, in one sense, the ego-
ism/altruism dichotomyi" in psychology is false, for under natural
law's conception of human excellence, one cannot instantiate
one's own unique personality without (at the same time) engaging
in helping others to do the same. It is not a quid pro quo. The
two are bound up indissolubly in the same activity. 14
Nurture, then, is a universal necessity and, if the principles of
natural law hold true, a universal moral command. It is applied,
like all moral commands, in particular circumstances. Although
the term is most commonly used regarding parental obligations
towards children,' 5 the need for differing kinds of nurturing and
13 See id. at 1-58 (discussing whether concern for others is based on
altruism or egoism).
14 It follows, of course, that Nietzsche and Ayn Rand are totally wrong,
and perversely so. Each found charity to be destructive of the ego's own
accomplishments. Id. at 26-27, 214. In fact, not only does the philosophy of
natural law dispute this, I believe that human experience shows it to be
false. Just listen to parents discussing the activities of parenting with one
another, or more directly, listen, if you could, to the private conversations at
the end of the day of a mother and father discussing their interrelated roles
in raising their children. In the very quest to nurture the children, each
parent defines his and her own moral personality. (And, in the same
process, the mother and father nurture one another.)
15 Often, however, in the nature vs. nurture debate, nurture loses its
richer meaning and becomes merely a synonym for behavior that is
influenced by a child's environment rather than by his genetic makeup. See,
e.g., SOCIOBIOLOGY, BEYOND NATURE/NURTURE? REPORTS, DEFINITIONS AND
DEBATE (George W. Barlow &James Silverberg eds., 1980) (examining how
genetic traits determine social behavior).
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the obligation to be a nurturer continue throughout our lives. It
is not, as Kohlberg suggested, a transient stage on the way to
adult Kantian moral independence.' 6 Nor is it a moral attribute,
as argued by Gilligan, primarily limited to the female gender.' 7
That we may see it most concretely actualized in mothers does
not mean that nurturing does not go on in other forms and other
relationships.' S A good teacher nurtures. A good lawyer is a nur-
turer. Even a child, in dazzling moments of insight, nurtures his
mother or father.
If nurture is a universal moral norm derived from natural law,
then what does that augur for the law, the polity and social pol-
icy?' 9 Can we find a system that not only protects persons from
the evil and careless acts of others, but encourages and supports
16 Cf 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
146-47 (1984) (demonstrating that young children do good for others to
please adults, not because it is appropriate moral behavior). For Kohlberg,
nurturance seems to occur at stage three in moral development: "Good boy
orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others.
Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and
judgment by intentions." Id. at 44, table 1.2.
17 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 62 (1982). Gilligan does not use the term nurture,
but an "ethic of care." For example, she writes, "The ideal of care is thus an
activity of relationship, of seeing and responding to need, taking care of the
world by sustaining the web of connection so that no one is left alone." Id
18 Even Aristotle noticed the particular excellence in the virtue of
friendship that mothers had for their children because of their greater
capacity for empathy ("one who shares his friend's joys and sorrows").
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book IX ch. 4, supra note 4, at 293. When I was a
second year law student, my instructor, Judge Jack Weinstein, invited his
evidence class to attend one of his trials at our convenience. The one I
attended was a negligence suit by two teenage boys who had been blinded
as children when they had set off some dynamite caps while playing by a
railroad track. After the jury panel had been seated, the judge asked the
plaintiffs to enter the courtroom. The two boys, carrying white canes, were
guided in. At the moment we all saw them and their scarred eyes, gasps of
dismay swept through the panel. One woman immediately stood up, her
eyes moving between the judge and the plaintiffs, and said in a voice that
was emotional but resolute, "Your honor, I am a mother. I don't know how
any mother can be objective in this case. I know I couldn't." The judge
excused her from the panel.
19 Because I am limiting the scope of my inquiry to nurture and the
modem natural law ethics, I am placing to one side the enormous literature
on "social justice." For the same reason, I must also hold in abeyance
commentary or analysis on the debate in current feminist literature on the
ethic of caring.
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nurturing relationships upon which moral excellence and human
happiness depend? Such a system would run counter to the ego-
ism that seems to dominate much of the political spectrum today.
When rights become simple powers, and not requirements for the
practice of moral excellence; when educational policy becomes
pressure group controlled, and is not directed towards the nur-
turing of the child or the parent/child relationship; when the
poor are treated as objects, and not subjects with potentialities of
individual self-realization; and when individuals are taught to per-
ceive of themselves primarily as members of victim groups, and
not as unique individuals with capacities for accomplishment; a
governmental attitude encouraging nurture would be an appro-
priate (if perhaps unwelcome) antidote. Such a governmental
policy should also respect an environment where nurturing rela-
tionships already flower, and be wise enough to leave it alone.
II. NURTURE AND THE NATURAL LAW
First some preliminaries. What do I mean by "natural law"? In
this Essay, I shall, in general, limit my discussion to the perspec-
tives offered by philosophers in the Aristotelian school, which is
about as mainline a natural law theory as one can find. Let us
begin our brief excursus with some working definitions that
accord in general with the views of many of the traditional natural
law theorists. Nature, we can say, is the way things are, and why
they are what they are (e.g., what is a manatee, and why is it differ-
ent from other water mammals?). Laws in the broadest sense are
rules, either describing (or predicting) how things act in fact (e.g.,
the phases of the moon), or (for purposeful agents) how they
ought to act (i.e., moral rules). Laws enacted by the state are an
amalgam of authoritative rules, a portion of which declare how
persons are to act. In short, laws seek to regulate human behav-
ior towards some end. Ultimately, natural law asks, what is the
end of human nature and how can laws assist humans to fulfill
that end?
The tradition of natural law is based on the argument that
moral and legal rules can be derived from a reflection on human
nature. 20 Conceptions of the relationship of nature to humanity
20 It was Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics that made the notion of nature
the grounding for morality, and eventually, law. EDGAR BODENHEIMER,
JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 6-20 (2d ed.
1967). As long as the proposition that nature and law are interrelated has
698 [Vol. 26:691
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and to law differ among many philosophers in the tradition.2'
Most, however, start with an idea of human nature, and from
been maintained, it has, of course, been contested. The Sophists, for
example, asserted that nature and law were opposed to one another. Id at
5-6. Kant, in contrast, held that nature could never be a source of moral
rules, while the modem philosophies of utilitarianism and positivism
remained skeptical of the natural law enterprise. Id. at 61-62. See, e.g.,
Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in THE
WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 502-06 (J.C. Smith & David N. Weisstub eds., 1983)
(arguing that rights of man derive from government, not nature); HANS
KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITCS IN THE MIRROR OF
SCIENCE 137-97 (1957) (criticizing notion that natural laws are basis for
human morality). Nonetheless, the natural law tradition persists. Since
1980, in particular, there has been an effusion of significant natural law
writing. See, e.g., CHARLES COVELL, THE DEFENCE OF NATURAL LAW: LAW AND
JUSTICE IN THE WRITINGS OF LON L. FULLER, MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, F.A.
HAYEK, RONALD DWORKIN, AND JOHN FINNIS (1992) (comparing natural law
principles among modern political theorists); FINNIS, supra note 6 (providing
overview and analysis of current natural law theory); DAVID GRANFIELD, THE
INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAw: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY (1988)
(examining whether classicist and modern theories of natural law may
provide basis for moral conduct); RUSSELL HrrrINGER, A CRrrIQUE OF THE
NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987) (critiquing modern natural law theory of
Germaine Grisez and John Finnis); ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981) (arguing that 18th century naturalism law
does not provide basis for morality); NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS (Robert George ed., 1992) (presenting current views on natural law
theory); DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN & DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL, LIBERTY AND
NATURE: AN ARISTOTELIAN DEFENSE OF LIBERAL ORDER (1991) [hereafter
RASMUSSEN] (arguing that Aristotelian principles can support Lockean
theory of rights); VEATCH, supra note 9 (analyzing natural law's role in
providing system of ethics); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
(1987) (analyzing relationship between natural law, legal positivism, and
justice).
21 See, e.g., GRANFIELD, supra note 20, at 177-216 (emphasizing
intersubjective essence of natural law); HrrTINGER, supra note 20, at 1-92
(analyzing natural law theory of Germaine Grisez and John Finnis). Some
natural lawyers, such as Herbert Spencer, perceive humanity as an aspect of
nature and urge that human laws reflect that fact. See, e.g., HERBERT
SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS (1978). Others, like Lon Fuller, see
natural law as part of a more focused inquiry on what constitutes the nature
of law itself. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96-106 (1964).
22 Sometimes equated with human good, derived from reason. See
FINNIS, supra note 6, at 35-36. By human nature, I mean the commonality of
humanness shared by all individual men and women at all stages of their
biological existence. The traditional noun "man" in this sense, even with its
unfortunate gender restrictiveness, carries the notion of an individual
human both in one's particular identity and in the collective essence of one's
University of California, Davis
that conception, seek to find the norms by which human law
should be formulated. 2 1 That approach is the hallmark of the
Aristotelian school.
The norms are normally derived by a reasoned reflection on
human life and existence in its individual and social aspects.
Once derived, those primary normative principles are available to
guide both the law maker and the individual, either imperatively
or aspirationally, into proper modes of action. Thus, the natural
law tradition rejects arriving at moral and legal norms from the
more narrow utilitarian concept of human nature as driven by a
pleasure/pain calculus. Likewise, the tradition (usually) rejects
the Kantian route of arriving at imperatives rationally and inde-
pendently of a conception of nature.2 4 Whether state of nature/
shared humanness with others. "Humankind" misses the individualistic half
of the concept, while "each and every human person" misses the shared
essence of what it is to be human. It is possible that the failure of present
day philosophers to arrive at an acceptable substitute for the word "man,"
which would meld the particular and the generic in a single noun, is but an
aspect of the disintegrative positivism of much of today's legal and moral
philosophy.
23 John Wild defines natural law as "a universal pattern of action,
applicable to all men everywhere, required by human nature itself for its
completion." JOHN WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES AND THE THEORY OF
NATURAL LAW 64 (1953) (emphasis omitted). In a similar vein, Ronald Garet
offers that natural law is "a theory that associates its claims about the
- ordering of basic social relations with claims about human nature. Natural
law theories elaborate a vision of human nature and attempt to make that
vision available to political philosophy." Ronald R. Garet, Natural Law and
Creation Stories, NoMos XXX: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 218, 218 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W Chapman eds., 1988). I think it evident that
even those who look at nature generically and those who concentrate on the
internal nature of law are both centrifugally pulled into the human focus. I
have suggested elsewhere that Fuller's defense of his theory against the
criticisms of H.L.A. Hart pushed Fuller into acknowledging the dependency
of his view on a moral theory of human action. See David F. Forte, Natural
Law and Natural Laws, 26 UNIVERSrrY BOOKMAN 75, 82 (1986) (arguing
"good" of law is connected to "good" of man). Another author has
suggested that Hart's minimal theory of natural law is far stronger than even
Hart apparently believed. See DANIEL W. SKUBNIK, AT THE INTERSECTION OF
LEGALITY AND MORALITY: HARTIAN LAW AS NATURAL LAW (1990).
24 See VEATCH, supra note 9, at 11-33. Note also Veatch's and Hittinger's
criticism ofJohn Finnis and Germaine Grisez on whether norms can indeed
be deduced from human nature as it is, or whether a "Kantian turn" towards
rationalism is a useful supplement. Id. at 93-104; HrrrINGER, supra note 20,
at 10-93 (criticizing Finnis' and Grisez' modern natural law theories); see also
WEINREB, supra note 20, at 108-15 (criticizing Finnis' natural law theory).
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law of nature theorists like John Locke are part of or opposed to
the natural law tradition remains contested.25
Although proponents of natural law sometimes disagree as to
its source, content, and justification, natural law seems to fulfill
the continuing need of the Western legalist to have some touch-
stone by which to judge the goodness or badness, or even per-
haps the validity or invalidity, of positive law.26 Accordingly, if
nurture is a moral excellence, we can judge whether the legal sys-
tem is assisting or hindering that good. We can assay whether
certain social programs are, in the true sense of the word,
justified.
Indeed, whether or not positive laws are justified is one of the
primary utilities of natural law theory. 27 If a positive law formally
and substantively meets the standard of justification, the natural
lawyer normally concludes that the law so promulgated carries
with it an obligation of the subject to obey. 28 Thus, the notion of
"the rule of law" morally binding all to obey justified positive
enactments (as opposed to the arbitrary power of a person or
group compelling obedience solely by coercion) is commonly a
necessary attribute of most natural law theories. 29 As Aristotle
put it, "[H]e who asks Law to rule is asking God and Intelligence
25 See VEATCH, supra note 9, at 4-10 (questioning whether state-of-nature
theorists ascribe to natural law theory). One study finds nearly everybody in
the natural law tradition. See FRANCIS H. ETEROVICH, APPROACHES TO
NATURAL LAW FROM PLATO TO KANT (1972) (tracing evolution of natural law
theory from ancient Greek to contemporary philosophers). The general
argument of Weinreb is that the state of nature theorists eventually led
Western thought away from a focus on the concept of nature to the state as
the source of law. See generally WEINREB, supra note 20. For an intermediate
position, see A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992).
26 To Georgio del Vecchio, for example, "The conception of absolute
justice is one of the fundamental needs of the human mind." GIORGIO DEL
VECCHIO, THE FORMAL BASES OF LAw 14-15 (John Lisle trans., MacMillan
Co., 1969) (1914). d'Entrves declared, "Natural law is the outcome of
man's quest for an absolute standard ofjustice." A.P. D'ENTRiVES, NATURAL
LAw: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 93 (2d rev. ed. 1972).
27 Yves Simon makes the connection succinctly: "[N]othing would be
right by enactment if some things were not right by nature." YVES R.
SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAw: A PHILOSOPHER'S REFLECTIONS
118 (Vukan Kuic ed., 1992).
28 See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 6, at 314-20 (proposing that positive laws
rooted in natural law principles generally compel greater obedience).
29 See id. at 270-76 (asserting that legal systems adhering to "Rule of
Law" promote notions of common good).
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and no others to rule; while he who asks for the rule of a human
being is bringing in a wild beast."" °
Whether a positive law is justified or not is, of course, question
begging. Consequently, natural law philosophers are almost
invariably drawn to the issue of justice, and to elucidate justice,
they usually require an implicit or explicit theory of rights. And a
theory of rights returns one to a reflection on the nature of the
human person.
The circularity of the reflective process (although not necessar-
ily one of circular logic), beginning and ending with the concern
of what it is to be truly human, often takes the natural law theorist
into fields of inquiry beyond philosophical logic. These theorists
have used history, theology, science, and art to illuminate the cen-
tral inquiry."' Yet despite the wide-ranging openness of the natu-
ral lawyer to different perspectives on what constitutes the
essence of human enterprise, many modern observers who have
had contact with the idea of natural law have the impression that
it is a narrow and static set of rules, something like a philosophi-
cal Decalogue. In casual conversation among academics, the
question is often heard, "Do you believe in natural law?" as if it is
a creed and not a reasoned theory. 2 Some think of natural law as
30 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book III ch. 16, 143 (T.A. Sinclair trans.,
Penguin Books, 1964) [hereafter ARISTOTLE, POLITICS]. And Giorgio del
Vecchio writes: "It is not without deep-seated reason that in all ages and
countries the idea of natural law, that is, one founded on the very reality of
things and not on the simple 'placet' of the legislature, has been cultivated."
DEL VECCHIO, supra note 26, at 15.
31 The works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Grotius are some classical
examples. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLrnCS, supra note 30 (analyzing interaction
between government and citizenry); ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 4
(defining characteristics of goodness, virtue, and happiness); CICERO, DE
OFFICIIS (Walter Miller trans., 1975) [hereafter CICERO, DE OFFICIIS]
(developing theory of duty), CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA (T.E. Page et al. eds.,
Clinton W. Keyes trans., 1966) [hereafter CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA] (using
history of Roman republic to analyze forms of government); GROTIUS, THE
RIGHTS Or WAR AND PEACE (DEJURE BELLI AC PACIS) (A.C. Campbell trans.,
1901) (analyzing rights of states in war and peace).
32 According to Alf Ross, the Scandinavian positivist, "Natural law seeks
the absolute, the eternal, that shall make of law something more than the
handiwork of human beings and exempt the legislator from the pains and
responsibility of decision." ALF Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 258 (1974).
Elsewhere, he concludes, "Such an attitude to life is typically infantile." Id.
Jeremy Bentham was more pithy, calling natural law "nonsense upon stilts."
2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
105 (John Browning ed., 1962).
Nurture and Natural Law
a self-contained set of immutable principles, anthropomorphically
operating as Holmes' "brooding omnipresence in the sky,' " a
stern demigod high in the legal mythos handing down laws to
humans or judging which human laws shall stand.34 That inaccu-
rate image of natural law may in fact derive from our notion of
law imbued in us by positivist legal philosophers of the last two
centuries. If law is a command backed by a sanction, then natural
law must be (if it existed) a Calvinist higher order meticulously
regulating how people can construct their affairs.35 People often
impute to others what they see in themselves.
In fact, most natural law philosophers not only have a broader
attitude as to what constitutes "law" than do the positivists, they
also emphasize the contextual manner in which the principles of
natural law operate. 36 If human nature is a constant, the human
personality is radically individualistic. If the social realm is an
essential element of every person's "humanness," the variety of
interpersonal experiences is nonetheless infinite.37
There is a further particular harm that comes from a static
image of natural law, besides its inaccuracy. It sees law as essen-
tially restrictive and not enabling. In contrast, for many natural
law theorists, the notion of natural law does not restrict the func-
tion of law, but enlivens it: "[T]he law first educates men and then
33 Holmes actually made the remark about the common law, not natural
law, but the negative image is the same. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi sovereign that can be identified .. ").
34 "The natural-law doctrine undertakes to supply a definitive solution to
the eternal problem ofjustice, to answer the question as to what is right and
wrong in the mutual relations of men." KELSEN, supra note 20, at 137.
35 Roscoe Pound describes natural law as an ideal law to which "the
positive law, the body of norms, that is, authoritative models or patterns of
decisions, should be made to conform." RoscoE POUND, JUSTICE
ACCORDING TO LAW 6 (1958). He tags this ideal law as "positive natural
law." Id. Russell Hittinger appropriately rejoins, "[lit is a mistake to
envisage natural law as a ready-made body of law (a meta-positive law, as it
were) to which the problems of human positive law can immediately be
referred." Russell Hittinger, Introduction to SIMON, supra note 27, at xxvii
(1992).
36 "When [fundamental principles of justice] are modified under
changed circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change, and it does not
always remain the same." CICERO, DE OFrIcIIS, supra note 31, at 33 (I.x.32).
37 See VEATCH, supra note 9, at 108-12 (arguing that creativity and
individuality are integral part of human nature).
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empowers them to decide," wrote Aristotle. 8 In other words, the
law (properly formulated), nurtures.
III. NURTURE AND RIGHTS
For natural lawyers, the ethic of caring has traditionally been
termed "subsidiarity," meaning assistance. 9 "Nurture," I think,
is the better descriptive. Nurture comprehends not only the obli-
gation to assist, but also connotes the supportive, interpersonal,
and individualistic kind of relationship that the natural law tradi-
tion affirms.4 °
What then are the human needs that need nurturing? And
who, in the indeterminable variety of possible relations and cir-
cumstances over time, has an obligation to meet these needs?
When can the state compel me to be my brother's keeper? It
seems clear we cannot assist everyone equally. As St. Thomas
Aquinas puts it, "[N]o man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy
on all those who need it."'4 ' Not only would such a task be impos-
sible, it would be destructive of one's own individuality. Nor, on
the other hand, can we become totally isolated, even by choice,
from assisting anyone else's beneficial objectives, or from
accepting the dependency we have on others for the constitution
of our own lives and identities.42 Where to begin? Where to
draw principled limits?
First, we should assume, as did the ancients, that for nurture to
38 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book III ch. 16, supra note 30, at 143.
39 FINNIS, supra note 6, at 146.
40 As Finnis defines subsidiarity, "[T]he proper function of association is
to help the participants in the association to help themselves or, more
precisely, to constitute themselves ...... Id.
41 SAINT THoMAs AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 191
(William P. Baumgarth & RichardJ. Regan eds., 1988). Aquinas also stated,
"Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is
true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some
particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to
someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have the
time.... " 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. IIa-IIae, Q. 31,
art. 2, reply obj. 1 (Richard C. Meyer ed., Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., 1947). See JUDrrH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE
(1990) for an argument that one's obligation to others is more wide-
ranging. For a discussion of others who hold that one's responsibility to
others is universal, see FINNIS, supra note 6, at 195.
42 See FINNIS, supra note 6, at 141-50 (highlighting human need for
friends, family, and community).
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have any place in a social order, the first rule must be: at the least,
do no harm.4" One cannot harm and nurture at the same time.44
But harm presupposes that another enjoys fundamental immuni-
ties. Thus a theory of rights must provide a source of necessary
immunities (including the loss of certain immunities when one
threatens another with harm). As we discover what we may, or
perhaps, must do for other people, we must set limits on the
means we utilize on what we can do to them. Assistance can only
be based, therefore, on aiding the good of the other. Assistance
that purports to use harm as a "necessary means" to someone
else's good would not only be an invasion of right, it would be
illogical and contradictory to its purpose. In a word, it would be
immoral.
Furthermore, a theory of needs-based obligations without a
theory of immunities could be used to justify a regime of positive
rights, seemingly with no protection against a state that smothers
individual rights in the name of benefitting citizens whilst leaving
virtually no room for the constituitive activities of the individual
human personality. 45 A bare theory of negative rights, on the
other hand, provides little protection for the fragile network of
supportive relationships upon which each of us depends.
The rub is this: if we have too weak a theory of rights, the indi-
43 "The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to
another, unless provoked by wrong ...... CICERO, DE OrrIcIs, supra note
31, at 23 (I.vii.20).
44 Simply because someone does not like something, or believes it is
painful, does not mean there is harm. Properly proportioned discipline (of
children and adults) is not a harm if done towards encouraging the
development of moral habits. Aristotle is blunt: "[T]he man who lives in
accordance with his feelings would not listen to an argument to dissuade
him, or understand it if he did. And when a man is in that state, how is it
possible to persuade him out of it? In general, feeling seems to yield not to
argument but only to force." ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book X ch. 9, supra note 4,
at 336.
45 See VEATCH, supra note 9, at 179-80 (arguing that government social
programs invariably entail impairing rights of some to benefit others). In
the draft Ukrainian Constitution, for example, Article 24 guarantees
equality, but permits special privileges if established by law. Article 40
permits freedom of expression unless it rouses religious hatred. Article 10
declares that "private property is inviolable," but Article 48 contains the
reservation: "The exercise of the right of ownership must not contradict the
interest of society as a whole or of individual citizens." DRAFT
CONSTITUTION OF THE UKRAINE (prepared by working group of
Constitutional Commission of Parliament of Ukraine, Jan. 1992).
1993] 705
706 University of California, Davis [Vol. 26:691
viduality of the person could be swallowed up in an enforced obli-
gation to assist others and society. If we have too strong a theory
of rights, we divide and separate humans from one another, break
essential connections between them, and, indeed, make weaker,
not stronger, the individual human identity. A governmental pol-
icy that increases separation in the name of individual rights
breaks the nurturing connections upon which human individuality
ultimately depends. The dilemma for the natural law theorist is in
reconciling a theory of needs with a theory of rights. A natural
law theory must therefore combine the notion of individual right
with individual good for there to be a coherent ethic of assistance.
IV. NURTURE AND THE GOOD
Just how does the Aristotelian school of natural law arrive at its
notion of an objective human good, which would include the
value of nurture? Putting aside the preliminary arguments
(mostly epistemological) that lead ultimately to its major operat-
ing premises, the Aristotelian natural law school holds that things
in nature are in motion (i.e., transition, change, development). It
holds that every thing moves (either by its own internal mecha-
nisms, or by external force) from potentiality to actuality; that the
nature of every thing distinguishes what its particular potentiali-
ties are;46 that there is a point (or state) of flourishing that every
thing could enjoy if its potentialities were fully actualized (its end,
or telos, which is its "good"); and that one can define what the
appropriate state of flourishing would be for any class of things
(healthy red oak trees, for example). Furthermore, every individ-
ual thing within a class has its own, never to be repeated or dupli-
cated, aspect of flourishing (no two mature, fully grown red oaks
are the same).47 What then is the nature of being human? What
is a person's end? What "good" is he striving for?
Now, because the Aristotelian image of things in motion
towards an end does not comport with the conceptualizations of
modern science,48 some of the more recent advocates of the Aris-
46 Or in some cases, what they can be, depending on the nature of action
taken upon it, as a block of stone can be a statute or a paper weight,
according to the purpose and execution of the craftsman.
47 A cogent and far more sophisticated restatement of the Aristotelian
argument can be found in VEATCH, supra note 9, at 58-67.
48 See BATSON, supra note 2, at 67-73 (contrasting approaches of
Aristotelian and Galilean sciences). Those Cartesian premises of modem
science have their own problems in attempting to describe nature as it really
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totelian school simply short circuit that process and move directly
towards discussing human nature.49 But they come to the same
general conclusions as Aristotle did. Retaining, therefore, the
position that things in the world are knowable through human
observation, and that their coherence is apprehensible to human
reason, the modern natural law advocates maintain, like Aristotle,
that the nature of the human being is to seek happiness and well-
being through the practice of virtue. The practice of virtue is the
state of flourishing, the end, the good, the perfection of human
potentialities that human nature aims at, even though the achieve-
ment of the end is by voluntary action and not by any pre-deter-
mined "natural" mechanism. 50 Hence (putting aside the practical
relevance of good and bad fortune), an individual is the responsi-
ble agent of the achievement of her natural end (i.e., the practice
of virtue), and can be appropriately blamed or praised depending
on how well she acts in achieving it.5"
That there is a more phenomenological methodology to the
observation of human nature today is not contradictory to the
reasoned reflection on human experience that Aristotle himself
espoused.52 In any event, the modern advocates of natural law
arrive at the same outcome that Aristotle did: the end (the state of
human flourishing) of all humans is happiness; happiness consists
of the practice of virtue (actually, happiness attends the practice
of virtue); virtue is a habit of moral action towards oneself and
others (classically, the search for truth and the practice of justice,
courage, and benevolence). 53 To achieve the state of well-being
is. See VEATCH, supra note 9, at 222-49 (comparing Aristotelian scientific
approach to modern scientific approach); Forte, supra note 23, at 77-80
(comparing Aristotelian science to contemporary scientific theories).
49 Or, in the case of Finnis, fundamental human goods discoverable by
practical reason. FINNIS, supra note 6, at 35-36.
50 VEATCH, supra note 9, at 82-83.
51 Id. Good fortune may assist, but ultimately every person is responsible
for the excellence of her own life.
52 "For the starting point is the fact; and if this is sufficiently clear there
will be no need to ascertain the reason why. Such a person can easily grasp
first principles if he is not already in possession of them." ARISTOTLE,
ETHICS, Book I ch. 4, supra note 4, at 67 (emphasis omitted). John Finnis's
method of apprehending the basic goods of life has a similar methodology.
See FINNIS, supra note 6, at 64-69. See generally WILLIAM A. LUIJPEN,
PHENOMENOLOGY Or NATURAL LAw (1967) (exploring various theories of law
including legal positivism, objectivism, existentialism, and natural law).
53 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book I ch. 7, supra note 4, at 75-76; see id. Book II
ch. 7, at 103-06 (relating expanded list of virtues and vices to moral mean);
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wherein virtue may effectively be practiced, a number of elements
are necessary. There must be a state whose structure both allows
and assists the practice of virtue. The coercive and educational
force of law must be used (indeed, can only be used) to enforce
justice (protect one in the enjoyment of one's rights); to help pro-
vide an infrastructure (economic, educational, military, and the
prevention of natural harms) in which the individual's physical
well-being and his exercise of virtue can flourish; and directly to
induce and assist the individual in the practice of virtue.54 In
other words, the objective of law is to seek the common good,
that is to say, the good (a state of human flourishing) that is com-
mon to all persons (in their respective individualities).55
V. NURTURE AND HUMAN FLOURISHING
What then are the elements of human flourishing, and how
does nurture relate to them? To begin, let us see how contempo-
rary natural law theorists distinguish human needs from human
goods.56 Henry Veatch, for example, lists as human needs,
food, clothing, and shelter; association and companionship with
others; knowledge and understanding; and opportunities for rest
and relaxation, and for aesthetic enjoyment, for the practice of
religion, and, indeed, for the so-called finer things of life.5 7
cf CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, supra note 31, at 17 (I.v. 15) (asserting that morality
arises from basic virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance).
54 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book X ch. 9, supra note 4, at 337.
55 "[T]he securing of a whole ensemble of material and other conditions
that tend to favor the realization, by each individual in the community, of
his or her personal development." FINNIS, supra note 6, at 154. The
common good, of course, includes justice, i.e., the protection of one's
negative rights and liberties. RASMUSSEN, supra note 20, at 143.
56 Many philosophers begin with the individual qua individual,
eliminating the accidents of contemporary society, and construct from there
what one's rights and obligations necessarily must be, or what one would
necessarily agree to be bound by. A natural law theorist, on the other hand,
may survey life as actually lived and arrive at certain "needs" or "goods" as
fundamental to being human. Compare JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
11-22 (1971) (analyzing how humans devise system of justice based on
principles of fairness) with FINNIS, supra note 6, at 81-85 (asserting that all
human societies share same basic values). Although that inquiry sometimes
overlaps with a utilitarian assessment, the natural law theorist generally
views human needs and goods as generic and objective, and not a numeric
compilation of so many subjective preferences. See, for example,
Maclntyre's criticism of utilitarianism. MACINTYRE, supra note 20, at 62-64.
57 VEATCH, supra note 9, at 117. Edgar Bodenheimer, in whose memory
the essays in this journal are written, notes that common human traits
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Elsewhere, Veatch articulates a more extensive rendering of
needs, but in the end, emphasizes that the "mere possession" of
these things is "not the whole story." The question is how wisely
and intelligently these things are used in the ultimate moral obli-
gation of living well and virtuously.58
How does one live well and virtuously? It is by participation in
the self-evident goods of human existence. John Finnis offers the
following: knowledge, life, play, aesthetics, friendship, practical
reasonableness (constructing a life's plan), and spirituality.59
Needs, therefore, are instrumental. I need sustenance in order to
live, books in order to learn. Goods, on the other hand, are
goods-in-themselves, valuable because the state of human flour-
ishing only occurs according to one's participation in those
goods. In that sense, listening to Mozart's Jupiter symphony is
non-instrumental; it is an aesthetic experience in and of itself.
Goods, of course, can at times be instrumental. I can listen to
the Jupiter Symphony as I study for my music appreciation exam.
On the other hand, some things serve as needs and goods at the
same time. Life itself is a good that is also a necessary instrumen-
tality for the enjoyment of all other goods.
Nurture is similar. Nurture is a need of all persons to develop
their individual potentialities. We are all perpetually dependent
to a greater or lesser degree on other persons in the achievement
of life's goods. Life requires sustenance, knowledge requires
include the need for food, the sex drive, the need for security and safety, for
recognition and esteem, for love, and for knowledge. EDGAR BODENHEIMER,
PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 54-56 (1980).
58 VEATCH, supra note 9, at 79-80. Even when considering the problem of
desperate needs, Veatch continues to be tugged by the principle of
individual responsibility. See id. at 182-83 (arguing that individuals are
ultimately responsible for providing for their own needs).
59 FINNIS, supra note 6, at 59-90 (1980). Similarly, Germaine Grisez's list
of human goods are
human life, which includes health and safety; all the arts and
skills that can be cultivated simply for the sake of their very
exercise; beauty and other objects of aesthetic experience;
theoretical truth in is several varieties; friendship, both as
relationship in immediate liaison and organization in larger
communities; the use of intelligence to direct action; the effective
freedom to do what one chooses with the whole force of an
integrated personality; and a proper relationship to the
fundamental principles of reality-i.e., to God.
Germaine G. Grisez, A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument Against Con-
traception, 30 THOMIST 343, 348 (1966).
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teaching, aesthetics requires example, friendship requires friends,
play requires playmates, spirituality requires a relationship with
some transcendent other, productivity requires reliable partners.
In this sense, a person cannot be a person without the nurturing
assistance given by another. Nurture is as much a requirement as
is safety.
At the same time, the giving of nurture is a moral good neces-
sary for one's happiness. It is easily granted by natural lawyers
that one's flourishing cannot occur without other persons to
interact with. But there is more to interacting with other persons
than there is in interacting with paints and a canvas, or with a
profit and loss sheet, or with a spring field in need of plowing.
When I interact with another person, I interact with another self.
I experience the other, inter-subjectively, as, in essence, equal to
myself.6 ° And thus, the "good" of the other person is as impor-
tant to me as is my good. Indeed, my own flourishing cannot suc-
ceed without my participation in the flourishing of others. In
sum, I cannot pursue my own individual flourishing without offer-
ing nurture to others. In the very act of nurturing another, I
experience my self more concretely. If a governmental policy
works to deny me nurturing opportunities, it denies me an essen-
tial part of my human flourishing.
In sum, the obligation to nurture derives from a notion that the
human person requires as an essential element of one's individual
human identity the receiving and giving of assistance, and the
alternate engagement in and disengagement from interpersonal
relationships. The ancient and medieval proponents of natural
law were fully at home with the idea in their notion of obligations
and more specifically in their definition of friendship. Aristotle
concluded that a friend is one who seeks the good of the other,
and that no person could achieve happiness (his natural end)
without virtuous friends."' In his long, fatherly, and preachy let-
ter to his son, away at school in Greece, Cicero admonishes that
everything that the earth produces is for man's use; and as men,
too, are born for the sake of other men, that they may be able
mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to fol-
low nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an
interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus
60 GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAY 77-78 (A.H. Campbell ed., Lady Guthrie trans., Edinburgh Univ.
Press, 1956) (1924).
61 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book IX ch. 9, supra note 4, at 293, 303-07.
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by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human soci-
ety more closely together, man to man.
62
Or as the more suspicious Pufendorf put it,
[A]ll the advantages that attend human life today derive from
men's mutual assistance. There is nothing in this world, save the
great and good God Himself, from which greater advantage can
come to man than from man himself.
63
It is in inducing and assisting the individual in the practice of
virtue that requirements of nurture arise. In Finnis's words, the
degree of human flourishing depends upon "the quality of inter-
action among persons." 64 Nurture is perhaps the highest quality
of interaction among persons, for its objective is to provide sup-
portive assistance that enables the other person independently to
flourish, to achieve excellence in his particular practice of the
virtues.
VI. NuRTURE AND THE LAW
From these observations it follows that a society that increases
the opportunities for nurture also increases the chances for
human happiness. How can the law assist? Seeing that the
perfection of persons lay in their practice of moral virtue, many of
the ancients looked to the state for the necessary means. Eventu-
ally, Cicero hoped, men would "do of their own accord what they
are compelled to do by law," but the nature of men's appetites
was such that a well-run state was of absolute necessity.65 Aris-
totle expected that education, directed by the family or the polity,
would train the person in moral virtue. But for those who did not
respond to such encouragement, who looked only to their selfish
impulses, the coercive power of the state had to restrain them.6 6
Some modem Aristotelians, on the other hand, are almost Lock-
ean in their defense of individual rights against the state,6 7 and
62 CICERO, DE OFrICIIs, supra note 31, at 24-25 (I.vii.22).
63 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 34 (James Tully ed., Micheal Silverthorne trans., 1991).
64 FINNIS, supra note 6, at 22.
65 CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, supra note 31, at 17 (I.ii.2).
66 "[I1n general, feeling seems to yield not to argument but only to
force." ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book X ch. 9, supra note 4, at 336.
67 As Veatch puts it,
no agency of society, of family, of friends, or of whatever can
make or determine or program an individual to be a good man,
or program him to live a life that a human being ought to live.
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insist that the needs of human persons, no matter how great, do
not give rise to positive rights with claims on others to assist.68
The modem Aristotelians may have a point. Granted that
cooperation and nurture should be encouraged in a society, the
fact is that the practice of nurture is so individual, so dependent
upon the nuances of a relationship at any one time, that it would
seem foolish if not arrogant of the state to try to define and
enforce when assistance should be given. After a winter storm
last December, for example, my two sons and I built a stegosau-
rus dinosaur out of snow in the backyard. We all three engaged
in the human good of play. To do so, we had prior "needs" of
certain things. We needed snow (an element of good fortune),
and life and health. We needed a backyard, and leisure, and
knowledge of what a stegosaurus looked like (which meant we
needed education, the results of other persons' participation in
research and knowledge, and books, and a system of free commu-
nication), all of which to be available to me had to come from the
fruits of work and an efficient economic system. Building the
stegosaurus was fun, and it also provided my sons with training in
cooperation, the development of motor skills, the manipulation of
a material element, an experience in aesthetics (it was a pretty
good stegosaurus), and some good exercise. How could any state
have "constructed" such a range of circumstances so that those
opportunities would have been available for me at that time?
Instead, attaining one's natural end as a human person is
nothing if not a "do-it-yourself" job.
VEATCH, supra note 9, at 84. For John Finnis, there are absolute rights,
derived from the absolute obligations one owes another never "to choose
directly against any basic value, whether in oneself or in one's fellow human
beings." FINNIS, supra note 6, at 225. In contrast, Veatch holds that rights
derive not from our obligations to others, but from our obligations to our-
selves. Quoting from another philosopher, Veatch asserts, "I ought to
develop my own potential for flourishing. So, others ought not to prevent
me from developing my potential .... So, by the principle of universal-
izability everyone has such a right." Gilbert Harman, Human Flourishing, Eth-
ics, and Liberty, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307, 318-19 (1983), quoted in VEATCH,
supra note 9, at 165 n.26. Rasmussen & Den Uyl deduce a range of primary
Lockean rights not from one's pursuit of the good, but from the inherent
potential of every person to pursue the good. Thus, one who is acting
against his own perfection still has as much right to liberty as does the well-
motivated person. RASMUSSEN, supra note 20, at 109.
68 "My answer must take the simple form of a simple denial that
individuals have any positive rights. There are no such things." VEATCH,
supra note 9, at 180.
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How could I justify using the coercive mechanism of the law to
take sufficient property from other persons to satisfy my needs of
time and a backyard to make snow sculptures?
Rather, it seems evident from historical observation that a legal
system that permits a wide range of personal activity (economic
and otherwise) in life's goods provides the most fertile basis for
the kind of society that is conducive to the practice of moral vir-
tue. But certainly, that cannot state the end of it. Even if we have
a (relatively) free economic society where the myriad forms of
nurture can best thrive, we also have a milieu where greed, self-
ishness, isolation, and self-destructiveness also thrive. That too
comes from the evidence of human experience. Is the state with-
out any power to go beyond mere prevention of harm and actu-
ally encourage (or even sometimes compel) other-regarding
behavior of individuals? If a parent can have a range of discipline
over a child (while still morally respecting the dignity and individ-
uality of the child), cannot society (through appropriately con-
structed means of consent) discipline its adult members (while
still respecting the dignity and individuality of each person)?69
The answer of natural law is, within limits, affirmative. The
state can assist the formation of a virtuous society.7 ° There are
two justifications for the limited intervention of the state to
improve the moral activities of the individual. One justification is
69 Rasmussen & Den Uyl hold that such a proposition cannot instill
virtue, for there is no free choice involved, and, in fact, instills the wrong
lessons: that state action is the answer to all of life's problems. RASMUSSEN,
supra note 20, at 212-13. They overlook the educative role of the state as
exemplar and the human mechanism of virtue as the habit of acting rightly
that Aristotle so trenchantly observed. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book II ch. 1,
supra note 4, at 91. Further, the objection that forcing a person to assist
another does not increase the subject's virtue is true but irrelevant. If one
should question what logic there was in forcing another to act virtuously,
since virtuous action requires voluntariness, the answer of the ancients, was,
in effect, that substantively, without the coercion, the subject was not about
to act virtuously anyway. There was another person in need who should
have been provided for. So at least the substantive need is fulfilled, and the
form of the virtuous act is maintained. Furthermore, because of law's
educative function, the habit of acting helpfully to another may eventually
be internalized so that the subject will act voluntarily and morally after all.
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, Book X ch. 9, supra note 4, at 337-38.
70 For an extraordinarily thorough examination of the relation of the
political order to virtue in history, see PAUL A. RAHE, REPUBLICS ANCIENT
AND MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1992).
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by need. The other justification is by co-ordination. In each case,
the purpose of state action is to assist the recipient of aid in the
achievement of her (morally justified) life's plan, and to educate
by discipline or example the giver in appropriate moral conduct
(whether the enforced giver accepts and internalizes the lesson is
her responsibility).
I begin by restating that nurture is relational, radically individu-
alistic, and would seem to have the best chance to flourish in a
society in which the material, temporal, and other opportunities
for mutual support are available. By and large, therefore,
because of the infinite range of circumstances and relationships
necessary for nurture to thrive between humans, a limited state
and a wide range of personal liberties is necessary. That is a logi-
cal conclusion supported by empirical observation of how individ-
uals thrive in free political and economic societies. But it does
not follow that the state therefore has no right to educate me in
the proper exercise of my freedom (i.e., using it towards the exer-
cise of virtue towards others), for the law necessarily sets an
authoritative standard. Nor does the notion of a limited state
necessarily prohibit it from inducing me to achieve a higher level
of participation in life's goods (e.g., subsidizing museums rather
than rock concerts).
I require liberty to participate more fully in the objective goods
of life, but there is no one pathway of human flourishing for me to
the exclusion of all others. It is not true that only I know which
options are best (I make mistakes). That comes too close to the
utilitarian fallacy. Rather, if I flourish through the practice of
moral virtue (my human "end") by pursuing a worldly craft well,
for example, it does not matter fundamentally what I do, so long
as I do it as excellently as I can. Freedom assists me in choosing
and executing a life's plan in which the ensemble of life's goods
works best for me, but I cannot do it alone. I am not omniscient
or all-powerful. Neither authoritarianism or radical individualis-
tic autonomy can be justified by the notion that there is only one
best way for me.
I am a law teacher. I attempt to pursue my craft in a spirit of
excellence. I attempt to practice moral virtues in the manner of
teaching and researching. Suppose that I had innate talents for
mathematics. Suppose, because of life's accidents, or harms, or
whatever, I never knew I had those talents. Suppose that had I
pursued math, I would have been a far better astrophysicist than I
am a teacher. Does that mean I am not flourishing? That my life
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is a failure? That I cannot practice virtue? Suppose I must give
up teaching through illness, or because the law school closes, or
because I must devote more time to the upbringing of my family.
Does that preclude me from the practice of virtue? Rather, does
it not mean that life would offer me opportunities for the practice
of other virtues, courage or fortitude, for example, rather than
intellectual wisdom? I may have a life's vocation, but its epiphany
is in the daily living of it.
-Liberty is a necessary requirement for the moral practice of
practical reason in forming a life's plan based on craft and virtue.
But if, forjustifiable and proportionate reasons (war and draft, for
example) my liberties are lessened, no wrong has been done to
me (unless the war is unnecessary). If, for justifiable and propor-
tionate reasons (public education, for example), some of my
property is taken through taxation, no wrong is done to me
(unless those in charge spend my compelled contribution
unwisely). In sum, a wide range of liberty is necessary to achieve
human flourishing. Any intrusion into that liberty must be justi-
fied. But an intrusion is justified if based upon the same objective
good that my right to freedom of action is based upon. It is the
objective good of human flourishing that is the touchstone upon
which liberty, limited government, and limited intrusions are all
based.
VII. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITED STATE ASSISTANCE
I now turn to when such limited intrusions by government can
be justified under natural law theory. The first justification is
because of need. Can the need of another be such to justify
depriving me of any of my individual rights, and if so, which
rights and how much? And if I grant that some needs of others
can justifiably intrude upon my rights, how can I do so without
losing any justification for negative rights altogether? That is the
great apprehension of many modern natural law writers. As
defenders of the limited state, they reasonably fear that any justifi-
cation for the imposition of claims against individuals based on
need would logically destroy the basis of negative rights and
immunities. Forcing a person to give his lawfully obtained prop-
erty or time to benefit another person invades immunities with
seemingly no logical stopping point.7'
71 For Veatch, Rasmussen, and Den Uyl, the good of practical
reasonableness or even the ultimate human good of constructing a life of
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But there is a logical stopping point. St. Thomas Aquinas
articulated how positive rights based on need can be both justi-
fied and limited. Asking, whether it is lawful to steal through
stress of need, 72 Aquinas answers in the affirmative. "[I]n a case
of extreme need,. . . that which [a man] takes for the support of
his life becomes his own property by reason of that need."'7 1 It is
noteworthy that Aquinas does not say that the theft is excused.
He says that there is no theft. There is, in fact, no taking of
another's property because need has made it the taker's property
"by reason of that need." How did the property holder lose his
right to his own property?
To begin with, it should be emphasized again that in the Aristo-
telian tradition, rights are derivative of the good. They do not
exist independently of the good. Aquinas is not saying that
needs, in and of themselves, give rise to a right. Fundamental
goods do. Based upon the logical requirement of universalization
(shared by other traditions, such as the Kantian and natural rights
schools), the recognition of a good or end to human existence
necessarily obliges me to respect that good in others as well as in
myself. Consequently, the good of life gives rise to a right to life,
and the good of knowledge to free communication, the good of
seeking the spirit to freedom of religion, the good of practical
reasonableness to a wide range of liberties, the good of friendship
to freedom of association. These are universal rights because the
fundamental goods are universal.
Thus, under natural law, it is the good, not the existence of
other negative rights, that defines the limits to rights. I have no
right to take another person's life for the benefit of a friend,
because life is an objective good of the other person. I have no
right to associate in order to commit a crime, because association
is for the mutual benefit (in all moral things) of its members.
For Aquinas, property is a real right, but it is a human right, an
instrumentality for the accomplishment of individual moral vir-
individual participation in the range of human goods necessarily requires
the enjoyment of an extremely wide range of liberty. Indeed, any
interference with legitimate (i.e., non harmful) choices by a free person
would need to be justified. VEATCH, supra note 9, at 206-07; RASMUSSEN,
supra note 20, at 108-09.
72 2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 41, at Pt. IIa-IIae, Q. 66,
art. 7.
73 2 id. at Pt. IIa-IIae, Q. 66, art. 7, reply obj. 2.
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tue.7 4 One element of moral virtue is to assist others in need (to
the extent one can without impinging on one's own morally legiti-
mate uses). But since one cannot succor everyone in need, it is
left to the individual to choose whom to aid in charity. Aquinas
does not construct general positive rights out of need, because
most needs are inchoate in relation to any individual. He is clear
that in those circumstances, no specific duty can be said to
attach.75 The needs are too general and contingent. Thus,
because of the moral good involved in certain specific relation-
ships, assistance to members of one's family or to friends is nor-
mally morally preferable to that of strangers.
But where a person's life intersects with your own, even at a
moment, and he is in dire need of food, for example, you have a
moral obligation to save that person out of your "superabun-
dance," that is to say, out of property you can spare to meet his
need (without proportionate danger to you, i.e., causing yourself
to starve).76 In that situation, because of the specificity of the two
selves (you and the starving man at one place in time), and the
utter dependence of the other person upon you, the duty you
have to him is no longer inchoate, but specific. By force of cir-
cumstance, it vests. If you have a specific duty to provide suste-
nance at the time, he has a specific right to it. 7 7
It follows, therefore, that in cases of extreme need, where one's
moral obligation would incontestably require one to assist
another (there being no practical alternative except your aid), a
specific duty has arisen and a claim-right derives from it. Indeed,
in law, we fasten such duties to parents in the raising of their chil-
dren, simply because that relationship is such that specific duties
74 "Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right
or Divine right." 2 id. at Pt. IIa-IIae, Q. 66, art. 7, reply.
75 Aquinas is specific: "Yet he that is able to give food is not always
bound to feed the needy." 2 id. at Pt. IIa-IIae, Q. 71, art. 1, reply.
76 Or causing another in your care to starve. One never can seek to do
good through harm.
77 Aquinas concludes,
Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is
evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever
means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some
immediate danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then
it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of
another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is
this properly speaking theft or robbery.
2 id. at Pt. IIa-IIae, Q 66, art. 7, reply.
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can be attached to it. There is no reason why the principle should
not apply to other specific relationships (even if not contracted
for) that arise in other arrangements of life. If the need is dire
and manifest, and, because of the lack of alternatives, the duty to
assist is specific, the moral duty gives rise to a right of assistance,
and the state could justifiably enforce that assistance.
The second justifiable mechanism by which the state could
assist the practice of virtue is through the notion of co-ordination.
Unlike state-of-nature theorists, and other egoist-based political
theories, natural lawyers have never had much trouble in justify-
ing (to themselves at least) the legitimacy of the state. It exists
because it is an efficient mechanism of coordinating material
needs among persons, because it can protect persons from harm,
because it can assist those in the performance of their moral
duties, individually as well as collectively, because it fulfills the
moral needs of persons for social/political interaction, and
because properly run, it can provide moral exemplars to the citi-
zens. A particular state, or regime, becomes illegitimate when it
materially fails to achieve those objectives. 8
By a reasonably responsive manner of eliciting consent, the
state may direct resources gathered from the citizens to projects
that advance the common good, that is, things which assist indi-
viduals to achieve moral excellence in their particular life's plans.
Thus, building an infrastructure of highways, or of water distribu-
tion, of a sound currency, or of education, or of care for the hun-
gry or ill, can legitimately be coordinated by the state. The state
may encourage certain morally beneficial activities: tax exempt
status for philanthropic or religious organizations, for example.
It may encourage productive associations, or aesthetics (perhaps
by spending more money, within reason, on a public building
simply to make it more beautiful). Those who administer the
state are under the moral obligation to be true to their craft as
well. Governmental programs should not be maintained because
they benefit the self-seeking interests of administrators (or of
groups of citizens). If the good can be more efficiently achieved
by non-regulation, or by less regulation, the state (i.e., those in
authority) would be morally bound to withdraw. More accurately,
because the good of interrelationships is best obtained by free-
dom to construct and pursue those relationships, the obligation is
78 The verbal summary is mine, but the concepts are evident in Aristotle,
The Politics; Cicero, De Re Publica; and Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Right.
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on the state to justify any intrusion designed to make those rela-
tionships more morally productive.
VIII. SOCIAL POLICY THAT NURTURES: RESCUE, ABORTION,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
What then should the policy of the state be to engender nur-
ture? Nurture, I have argued, instantiates individuality in another
person by facilitating the self-directed and informed choice
among the infinite ways of participating in the fundamental goods
of human existence. There are, therefore, two limits implicit in
the nurturing of another. There is the extrinsic limit of immuni-
ties: one cannot seek to help another through harm. In addition,
there is an intrinsic limit: aid which makes the receiver too depen-
dent, which, on balance, limits the receiver's capacities for volun-
tary virtuous action, is contrary to the purpose of nurture.79 As
no individual action that violates either of these limits could be
morally justified, so too would any government policy that did so
be unjustified.
Suppose we left behind for a moment attitudes based on some
ideologies of the day (e.g., will-directed autonomy, or religiously
derived notions of what a society should look like), and we looked
at some present policies in the law solely on the basis of whether
those policies encourage or discourage the necessary virtue of
nurture. What could we speculate as to what the policy implica-
tions would be if the government sought to assist the giving of
nurture while being respectful of the fact that the nature of nur-
ture requires that it be primarily an individual decision based on
particular and transitory circumstances? What different perspec-
tive could we bring to serious issues of conflict like the duty to
rescue those in need, how to approach the reality of abortion, the
failures in education, or the human tragedies of those on welfare?
The following speculations are necessarily curt and tentative.
Each of these policy areas has an enormous literature dedicated
79 Thus, providing free drugs to addicted persons would not be, in most
circumstances, a nurturing act (unless, perhaps, when survival is at stake).
On the other hand, reducing the chances for one to harm another is not
incompatible with a nurturing ethic. Accordingly, incarcerating dangerous
criminals to protect the safety of others is not contradictory to a regard for
the independence of others. Indeed, incarcerating such criminals may well
be a duty of the state, not only to protect citizens from harm, but also to
secure part of the infrastructure (safety) in which citizens can develop their
individual capacities for virtue.
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to it. Thus, the views offered here are only suggested points of
departure and certainly do not imply that solutions are easily
obtained. In fact, line drawing in each area can be daunting. In
each of these areas, however, it is clear that public policy has thus
far failed. The failure may not be so much in execution as in
applying the wrong standard. Perhaps the standard of nurture
offers a better hope.
A. Duty to Rescue
If Aquinas was right, then the common law has been wrong for
many centuries on the duty to rescue.80 If a person is in dire need
of rescue and one can save him without danger to oneself, the law
would certainly be justified in enforcing that duty. But not
according to the common law.
Suppose A, standing close by a railroad, sees a two-year old
babe on the track, and a car approaching. He can easily rescue
the child, with entire safety to himself, and the instincts of
humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps,
justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is
not liable in damages for the child's injury, or indictable under
the statute for its death.8 '
Although the common law might recognize that such a duty is
compelled by "higher law," it would not enforce it, but leave the
withholding of saving assistance to be "condemned by the voice
of conscience, whose sentence of punishment for the recreant act
is swift and sure."82 The natural law tradition differs. Cicero
insisted on the point:
There are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice-the one, on
the part of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those
who, when they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom
it is being inflicted.83
But the common law's (and modern rights theory's) notion of
the autarkic personality continues. As such, the law educates
80 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF
TORTS § 56, at 375-77 (5th ed. 1984) (defining duty to aid one in peril).
81 Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (1897).
82 Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282 (1903).
83 CICERO, DE OrricIIs, supra note 31, at 25 (I.vii.23). Also see Judith
Shklar's definition of passive injustice: "By passive injustice I do not mean
our habitual indifference to the misery of others, but a far more limited and
specifically civic failure to stop private and public acts of injustice." SHKLAR,
supra note 41, at 6.
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badly, and teaches that the moral imperative to assist others in
dire circumstances need not be fulfilled.84 Nonetheless, if the
common law imposes liability on a parent for failing to save her
child from imminent peril,85 the same principle should logically
apply to other relationships, either formed or created through
force of circumstance, where one party is in desperate need of
assistance from another. "Good Samaritan" legislation can and
has been passed, immunizing from suit those, such as physicians,
when they do seek to rescue.86 But, in addition, it does not seem
to be unjustified to compel rescue attempts in life threatening cir-
cumstances if there is no reasonable danger to the rescuer.8 7 Ver-
mont has a statute that St. Thomas Aquinas could have written.
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical
harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without
danger or peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by
others.8
8
Admittedly, very difficult questions remain as to how to measure
"danger," and when the call to assist is so intrusive that it does in
fact ask too much of the would-be rescuer. Indeed, in certain
medical situations, the notion of "saving" the desperately ill may
be problematical. However, based on the natural law ethic of
assistance, it seems plausible that some baseline could be
articulated.
B. Abortion
If instead of looking at the abortion controversy as a conflict
84 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (holding that social workers' failure to protect child from father's
violence did not violate child's civil rights).
85 See Joel J. Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of
Rights, Responsibility, and Decisional Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 257
(1991) (exploring duties parents have to protect their children from harm).
86 In international law, the right to intervene to rescue in dire
circumstances seems at last to be emerging. One precedent may well be the
rescue mission to Somalia.
87 A deeper moral problem, faced by abolitionists of the last century and
pro-life activists today, arises when the state affirmatively forbids rescue.
88 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19(a) (1973); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.05(1) (West 1988) (defining duty to assist); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.34(2)(a) (West 1988) (imposing an obligation to summon assistance).
I am grateful to Professor Joel Finer for this information.
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between two (asserted) rights holders,8 9 what would we conclude
from a perspective based upon nurture? If there is a duty of care
and nurture to those who, by whatever circumstance, are placed
into our dependency,9" then the law again educates badly if it
does not assist us in recognizing that relationship. If modem
rights theory offers a barrier between mother and child, then it
may prevent one who is in need of nurture from receiving it, and
permits another to deny oneself the moral benefits of nurturing.9'
Indeed, the image the law makes of the abortion decision is one
of such singularity and loneliness, that neither party is seen as
deserving solicitation or care. Both lives are lessened. 92 Perhaps
a new paradigm can be offered, where, instead of there being two
rights holders in opposition to one another, there is a larger ethic
of care and nurture directed to all persons involved.
But what should one do in a state where an anti-nurturing pol-
icy has been entrenched? We should, at the least, mitigate the
current effects of the law. There seems to be large agreement
that there are too many abortions. Given that there are 1.6 mil-
lion abortions annually and only 25,000 infant adoptions, some-
thing seems desperately awry.93
One can offer the pregnant woman practical options to
encourage a nurturing result (as well as encouraging mutually
respectful forms of behavior that decreases the chances for
unwanted pregnancies).94 For example, such options could
include medical care, adoption opportunities (and appropriate
89 See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)
(analyzing abortion issue as struggle between rights of women and rights of
fetuses).
90 Under natural law, it is hard not to see the fetus as a person, for there
is the unfolding of various human potentialities into human actualities, and,
like the born person, the fetus remains human and a self throughout the
process.
91 Neither does modern law fully address the needs of nurture for the
pregnant mother or so many families themselves in need of nurture in order
to nurture.
92 Relational theory would not work either. See generally GILLIGAN, supra
note 17, at 62 (exploring theories attempting to explain women's
experiences in psychological terms). The first rule remains: do no harm.
One cannot justifiably benefit one set of relations by affirmatively harming
another person in an essential good.
93 Infant adoptions are those under two years of age and encompass all
children, including those with special medical needs. Mary Beth Seader,
Plenty of Room for the Children, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at B5.
94 Programs to discourage pregnancy are possible, but the same moral
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counselling), and, logically, information such as approved in
Planned Parenthood v Casey 9 5 which encourages empathy with the
developing human fetus upon which the moral decision to nur-
ture can be predicated. In each case, the question would be
whether the governmental policy encourages the giving of nur-
ture to those who need it and the experience of giving nurture to
those who have the opportunity to do so. 9 6
C. Education
The policy of education of the young offers a lesson. Even
though the practice of nurture is radically particularistic, there are
certain universals, so that a range of nurturing policies for an
entire group of the population can reasonably be formulated.
Education is one example, perhaps basic health care is another. It
would seem that the state should have two objectives in a general
nurturing education policy. The first is to assure that all young
people receive proper training in the fundamentals of education:
language, mathematics, aesthetics, physical health, and social and
civic skills. Secondly, the policy should be to encourage parental
involvement, for parents have primary nurturing responsibilities
in making individualized decisions geared to the propensities of
their own children.9 7
For the first, the current failure of general educational policy
limitations apply: do they cause harm in the enjoyment of any of the primary
goods of life? This obviously opens up the complex issue of sexuality.
95 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Nor, in an ethic of nurturing, should public
policy fail to address the needs of the pregnant woman involved.
96 It seems clear that the (proposed, at this writing) Freedom of Choice
Act, by prohibiting such governmental assistance and information approved
in Casey, cannot be morally justified by any reference to the moral good of
nurture. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, H.R. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (prohibiting states from restricting woman's right to abortion before
fetal viability or at any time if necessary to protect health or life of woman).
97 The underlying rationale of Chief Justice Burger in permitting the
Amish to remove their children above the eighth grade from public school
was that the Amish accomplish the good of nurturing as well if not better
than does the public school for children at that age. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 223 (1972) (citing fact that Amish can do better job of
preparing Amish children for adult life in Amish society than can public
school system); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking
down law seeking to assimilate foreigners by forbidding foreign language
instruction in public schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (invalidating Oregon statute that required young children to attend
public school in order to assimilate them into American society).
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remains evident98 and should, of course, be addressed on its own
merits. For the second, however, there are interesting options.
Assuming basic competence among available schools, offering
parental choice among schools seems to be morally appropriate:
it encourages nurturing and the receiving of appropriate individ-
ualized nurture. Preventing parents from exercising responsible
nurturing decisions is precisely the self-regarding governmental
policy that is opposed to the principles that we have enunciated. 99
D. Welfare
How can a policy be nurturing when it discourages the very acts
of self-realization that each person is obligated and entitled to
pursue? Here too, there seems a clear consensus that there are
too many Americans dependent on welfare and that the current
policy is not working towards alleviating that problem.
Early in American history, most (privately based) welfare poli-
cies required a personal relationship between the giver and
receiver, the distribution of assistance for specific needs, and the
requirement that the recipient "do something" if at all possible in
exchange for help. All the fundamental elements of nurture were
present, including the actions that induced self-sufficiency, self-
esteem, and eventually, independence of the recipient. In gen-
eral, the welfare agencies at that time encouraged "filiation and
bonding," essential elements of intimacy for nurture to bloom.l00
In contrast, current welfare programs are anti-nurturing. Case
workers, overwhelmed, have little contact with recipients. The
very volume of paperwork makes the recipient distant and anony-
mous from the distributor of services. The economic structure of
welfare offers unusually strong disincentives for the recipient to
98 See A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM: A
REPORT TO THE NATION AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF EDUC., NAT'L COMM. ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. (1983) (comparing
lack of educational achievements in reading, mathematics, time in school,
and quality of teachers in United States schools as opposed to those in other
developed countries).
99 In line with the principle of encouraging nurture and avoiding harm, a
school choice program would necessarily have to have fail-safe provisions to
deal with children caught in schools that are failing because more
responsible parents have opted to send their children elsewhere.
100 The best comparative analysis of the effects of past and present
welfare policies can be found in Marvin Olasky's work, from which this
summary is drawn. See OLASKY, supra note 3, at 6-41 (delineating why
current welfare programs work to support culture of poverty).
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plan and execute a strategy for economic independence. And the
same structure discourages nurturing relationships through
which the individual's self-realization in the goods of life could be
furthered.' °" Such a policy cannot be morally justified under the
ethic of assistance that derives from natural law.
In light of the fact that nurture succeeds in an environment
which is relational and particular, it would seem that attempts to
make welfare "more efficient" at the national level will not accom-
plish the moral goal. Rather, a devolution in funds and control to
local institutions (public and private) where, as in schooling, the
recipient might exercise some personal choice (with the state set-
ting basic and uniform standards) would offer some reasonable
hope of success. 102 Considering the moral and economic harm
that the current policy is inflicting, something along an entirely
different direction seems morally imperative.
CONCLUSION
A brief reflection on these policy areas indicates that the state
cannot take the place of the nurturing acts between individuals. It
can assist the formation of those relationships. It can seek to pre-
vent the vulnerabilities present in intimate relationships from
resulting in harm (spousal abuse or abortion, for example), but it
cannot construct its own alternative to how humans can benefi-
cially interact. It can coordinate the generic basics of security,
subsistence, and education; it can encourage patterns of nurtur-
ing (parental involvement in education, a wider range of informa-
tion available in abortion decisions, welfare policies that reward
bonding and independence); it can seek to prevent harm (rescu-
ing those in need), but it cannot regulate the variety of interper-
sonal decisions upon which effective nurturing depends. In sum,
the state is morally obliged to respect the goods that come from a
reasoned reflection on human nature. And those goods, includ-
ing nurture, depend upon the individual's own commitment to
excellence.
101 Id. at 167-99.
102 See id. at 200-33.
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EPILOGUE
While I was completing this Essay, word arrived that a beloved uncle of
my wife's had died. He had suffered for some time from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS). During the years, as the use of his body progressively dimin-
ished, he maintained a gentle and infectiously happy spirit that was his hall-
mark in more vigorous days. He privately brooded about many things, but
never complained about his illness, continuing on with a quiet fortitude. He
saw himself through his children's college graduations, and the marriage of
his daughter. During his last months, his family drew around him, chatting
with him, washing and feeding him. He dictated letters to his wife and
children. One Saturday he died suddenly and peacefully in the middle of the
day. He had, throughout, continued to nurture and be nurtured, and even
in the last stages of his illness, his humanity flourished.
The best thing society could do in those circumstances was, perhaps, to
coordinate appropriate medical care, and otherwise, leave the intimacies
between that man and his family alone and unrestrained. For in the end,
the act of nurture is an act of love; and nurture, mutually given and
received, is a celebration. And a society whose laws encourage nurture calls
out of us the best parts of our humanity.
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